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NASH EQUILIBRIA IN OPTIMAL REINSURANCE BARGAINING
MICHAIL ANTHROPELOS AND TIM J. BOONEN
Abstract. We introduce a strategic behavior in reinsurance bilateral transactions, where agents
choose the risk preferences they will appear to have in the transaction. Within a wide class of
risk measures, we identify agents’ strategic choices to a range of risk aversion coefficients. It is
shown that at the strictly beneficial Nash equilibria, agents appear homogeneous with respect to
their risk preferences. While the game does not cause any loss of total welfare gain, its allocation
between agents is heavily affected by the agents’ strategic behavior. This allocation is reflected in
the reinsurance premium, while the insurance indemnity remains the same in all strictly beneficial
Nash equilibria. Furthermore, the effect of agents’ bargaining power vanishes through the game
procedure and the agent who gets more welfare gain is the one who has an advantage in choosing
the common risk aversion at the equilibrium.
Key-words: optimal reinsurance contract; Nash bargaining; Nash equilibrium; strategically chosen
risk aversion; risk-sharing games.
1. Introduction
This paper proposes a game-theoretic bargaining approaches in optimal reinsurance and the
strategic behavior of the insurer and reinsurer, where the strategic set refers to a risk preference pa-
rameterization. In particular, the insurer and the reinsurer strategically choose the risk preferences
that will apply to the reinsurance transaction. For any submitted risk preferences, a reinsurance
contract is given by an indemnity function and a premium. This paper particularly shows that the
Nash equilibrium occurs when one agent (insurer or reinsurer) mimics the preferences of the other
agent, which establishes an endogenous homogeneity on the effective risk preferences.
Originating from the seminal work of Borch (1960) and Arrow (1963), the optimal reinsurance
problem is traditionally studied as the optimization of the utility of the insurer given a premium
principle. A premium principle is used to represent the interests of the reinsurer, and popular exam-
ples are the expected value principle, the standard deviation principle, and the exponential principle
(see, e.g., Kaas et al. (2008) for an overview). Raviv (1979), Aase (2009), and Boonen et al. (2016)
propose a different perspective, where the reinsurer is modelled as an agent that bargains with the
insurer. We follow these approaches and consider preferences that are comonotonic additive. Such
preferences are first characterized by Schmeidler (1986), while used in optimal reinsurance problem
by Boonen et al. (2016).
In the formulation of the game, we propose that for any submitted risk preferences by the
agents, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution produces a reinsurance contract. The asymmetric
Nash bargaining solution can be seen as a generalization of the Nash bargaining solution, which is
M. Anthropelos is supported in part by the Research Center of the University of Piraeus.
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a seminal solution concept in cooperative bargaining (Nash, 1950). There have been many papers
that have studied the Nash bargaining solution (see, e.g., Van Damme, 1986; Rubinstein et al.,
1992; Britz et al., 2010), and it is arguably the most popular solution concept in cooperative bar-
gaining. Kalai (1977) shows that such asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions are Pareto optimal
and individually rational. Asimit and Boonen (2018) show that Pareto optimality and individual
rationality constitute reinsurance contracts where the indemnity function minimizes a particular
sum of risk measures (while the corresponding premium is flexible and not uniquely determined).
The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution then yields a particular choice of this premium.
We readily get that any Pareto-optimal reinsurance contract and the induced welfare gains
strongly depend on the agents’ risk preferences. It is then reasonable to assume that agents have
motive to strategically choose the risk preferences that will appear to have in the transaction
and may state different preferences than their true ones. The rationale behind this argument is
that reinsurance transaction is bilateral (i.e., similar to a duopoly) and hence both of the agents
can heavily influence the transaction with their actions. This means that agents should take into
account their ability to affect the transaction when they negotiate the reinsurance contract, whose
most crucial part is apparently the agents’ risk preferences. Based on this, we propose a game where
each agent’s set of strategies is the actual risk preferences that he will apply to the transaction, or
in other words, we ask how much risk averse he is going to appear.
Pure-strategy Nash equilibria have been recently studied within the concept of thin financial
markets (see, e.g., Anthropelos et al., 2019; Malamud and Rostek, 2017; Rostek and Weretka, 2008,
2015). Agents (i.e., traders) behave strategically when submitting their demand functions on a given
vector of tradeable assets. For instance in Anthropelos et al. (2019), similarly to our model, traders’
set of strategic choices is parameterized by risk aversion coefficient that appears in their demand
function. On the other hand, pure-strategies in risk-sharing transactions when the contract is
endogenously derived in the equilibrium are recently studied by Anthropelos and Kardaras (2017)
and Anthropelos (2017). The former considers exponential utility maximizers whose strategic set
is the subjective probability measure that agents declare in the transaction; while in Anthropelos
(2017) each agent strategically chooses the risky portfolio he is willing to share with the other agent.
Our focus is on the constrained problem of the optimal reinsurance transaction, where the loss
function and the premium result from a bilateral cooperative bargaining. We consider the family of
comonotonic additive risk measures for both insurer and reinsurer (as in Boonen et al., 2016), and
we use a parameterization in a way where the parameter can be seen as the level of risk-aversion.
Consistent with this parameterization are the majority of the well-known risk measures.
Following the aforementioned argument, we define as agents’ strategic set the interval of ad-
missible risk-aversion parameters, allowing the agents to choose how much risk averse they appear
in the risk-sharing. For the proposed game, we further assume that for any submitted risk aversion,
the corresponding reinsurance contract will be determined by the optimal sharing rule (i.e., the one
that minimizes the sum of risk measures). The justification of this setting is based on the socially
optimal welfare gain, in the sense that the loss of utility caused by agents strategic behavior is
minimized (also used in similar models of Anthropelos and Kardaras, 2017; Anthropelos, 2017). In
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fact, as it is shown in Section 3, our proposed game does not decrease the total welfare, but rather
affects the reinsurance premium and hence the gain’s allocation.
It is furthermore shown (Theorem 4.4) that within the set of Nash equilibria that result in a
strict improvement compared to the status quo, agents’ best-response is to mimic the risk aversion of
his counterparty. In other words, at the equilibrium both agents appear with the same risk aversion
(even if their true risk preferences are different). It is also endogenously derived that the possibly
different exogenous agents’ bargaining power does not influence neither the equilibrium reinsurance
contract nor the premium. This is an important feature of our model, since the determination of
the agent who has more market power is not exogenously given, but rather it is a part of Nash
equilibrium.
The set of Pareto optimal Nash equilibria is not a single-valued and there should be an ad-
ditional criterion for the selection of a specific one. An idea is based on the so-called Stackelberg
equilibrium argument. In this concept, one of the agent is the leader and first states his parameter,
while the other follows. We show in Theorem 4.9 that the Stackelberg equilibrium is indeed a Nash
equilibrium, and that all gains from reinsurance transaction (if any) go to the leader by mimicking
the preferences of the follower (leaving the follower at a indifferent level).
Stackelberg equilibria have been recently studied for the context of price competition in a
duopoly by Albrecher and Dalit (2017), while Chen and Shen (2018) study them in dynamic dif-
ferential games. The closest approaches to ours are the ones of Chan and Gerber (1985) and
Cheung et al. (2019), who study Bowley solutions. In Bowley solutions, the reinsurer serves as
the leader. Then, the risk-neutral reinsurer states a Wang’s premium principle in such a way that
it anticipates the optimal reinsurance contract selected by the insurer given this premium principle.
In our approach however, the total premium is determined by a Nash bargaining solution, which is
a result of bargaining under the strategically chosen risk preferences.
This paper is set out as follows. Section 2 states the bargaining model without strategic
behavior. Section 3 introduces the game where the insurer and reinsurer are allowed to choose the
risk preferences in the transaction, while Section 4 provides a characterization of set of the Nash
equilibria and the exact structure the form of the related Stackelberg equilibria. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
2. The Model
We study the case of an insurer seeking for reinsurance. The insurer is endowed with initial
risk (his insurance portfolio) X that is realized at a given future reference time. We assume that
X is a random variable defined on a probability space (Ω,F ,P) and X ∈ L∞, i.e. X belongs to the
class of bounded random variables on (Ω,F ,P). As usually in the literature, we also assume that
X is non-negative and not a constant almost surely.
The insurer can cede part of the risk X to the reinsurer. In particular, the insurer will cede
I(X) to the reinsurer, and the riskX−I(X) is retained, where function I determines the reinsurance
payment. Naturally, to interpret I(X) as an indemnity, it holds that 0 ≤ I(X) ≤ X and also assume
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that I ∈ I, where
I := {I(·) : I(0) = 0, 0 6 I(x)− I(y) 6 x− y, ∀ 0 ≤ y < x}.(1)
In other words, the loss functions I(x) and x−I(x) are increasing and any increment in compensation
is always less than or equal to the increment in loss. Note that these properties of the ceded loss
function I are linked to the discouragement of moral hazard (Denuit and Vermandele, 1998; Young,
1999). In fact, I ∈ I is equivalent to I(0) = 0, I is absolutely continuous, and 0 ≤ I ′(x) ≤ 1 for all
x ≥ 0, almost everywhere (Zhuang et al., 2016).
We index the insurer as agent 1 and the reinsurer as agent 2. The insurer and reinsurer are
both endowed with risk measures that they aim to minimize. These are denoted by ρ1 and ρ2 and
satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 2.1. For i ∈ {1, 2}, the risk measure ρi satisfies (see also the related discussion in
Boonen et al. (2016)):
• monotonicity with respect to the order of L∞;
• ρi(0) = 0 and ρi(1) = 1;
• comonotonic additivity: ρi(Y ) = ρi(I(Y )) + ρi(Y − I(Y )) for all Y ∈ L
∞ and all I ∈ I.
Note that the normalization and comonotonic additivity imply that ρi is cash-invariant, i.e.,
ρi(Y +a) = ρi(Y )+a for every Y ∈ L
∞ and a ∈ R. Also, comonotonic additivity and monotonicity
together with a regularity assumption on continuity imply the Choquet representation of Schmeidler
(1986). If ρi is also law-invariant
1, it can be represented as a distortion risk measure (Wang et al.,
1997). Risk measure ρi is a distortion risk measure when:
ρi(Y ) =
∫
∞
0
gi(SY (z))dz +
∫ 0
−∞
[gi(SY (z)) − 1]dz, for all Y ∈ L
∞,
where SY (z) := 1 − FY (z) is the survival function of Y and the distortion function gi is left-
continuous, non-decreasing, gi(0) = 0, and gi(1) = 1. Popular examples of such distortion risk
measures are the Value-at-Risk (VaR) and the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR).
In return for the coverage of the indemnity I(X), the insurer pays a non-negative premium
pi ≥ 0 to the reinsurer. The insurer aims to minimize ρ1(X − I(X) + pi), and the reinsurer aims to
minimize ρ2(I(X) − pi) for a reinsurance contract (I, pi) ∈ I × R+.
As a first economic criterion, we propose individual rationality. A contract (Iˆ , pˆi) ∈ I × R+ is
called individually rational if
ρ1(X − Iˆ(X) + pˆi) ≤ ρ1(X),(2)
ρ2(Iˆ(X)− pˆi) ≤ ρ2(0) = 0.(3)
The individual rationality obviously a minimal requirement (since if it does not hold then agents
will not agree to the reinsurance transaction). The status quo situation (i.e., when agents do not
proceed to any reinsurance) is given by I(X)
d
= 0 and pi = 0.
1A risk measure ρi is called law-invariant if for any Y1, Y2 ∈ L
∞ with Y1
d
= Y2, then ρi
(
Y1
)
= ρi
(
Y2
)
.
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As a second economic criterion we impose the well-known Pareto optimality. A contract (Iˆ , pˆi)
is called Pareto optimal when there no other contract (I, pi) ∈ I×R+ such that ρ1(X−I(X)+pi) ≤
ρ1(X − Iˆ(X) + pˆi) and ρ2(I(X)− pi) ≤ ρ2(Iˆ(X)− pˆi), with one inequality strict.
According to Theorem 3.1 of Asimit and Boonen (2018), an individually rational reinsurance
contract (Iˆ , pˆi) is Pareto optimal if and only if I solves
(4) min
I∈I
ρ1(X − I(X)) + ρ2(I(X)).
It is important to emphasize at this point that (due to the cash-invariance property) the
determination of the Pareto-optimal contract does not include the premium. This means that
there should be another criterion to determine the premium for a Pareto-optimal loss function
I. The criterion that we impose for this is given by the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.
A characterization of the asymmetric Nash bargaining is provided by Kalai (1977) and is similar
as the Nash bargaining solution (originally introduced in Nash (1950)), but without a symmetry
axiom. More precisely, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, with bargaining power δ ∈ (0, 1)
for reinsurer and 1− δ for the insurer, is given by
max
(I,pi)∈I×R+
(ρ1(X)− ρ1(X − I(X) + pi))
1−δ(−ρ2(I(X) − pi))
δ ,
s.t. ρ1(X) ≥ ρ1(X − I(X) + pi),(5)
0 ≥ ρ2(I(X) − pi).
Note that, as in the seminal paper of Kalai (1977), the above characterization is for the convex
problem. In general, a convex bargaining problem is determined by a convex and compact set
A ⊂ R2 of feasible utility levels and a disagreement point d ∈ R2. In our case, the utility level is
the negative of a risk measure and the disagreement point is the vector d = (−ρ1(X), 0). Again by
(Kalai, 1977) we have that the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is individually rational and
Pareto optimal, and thus the indemnity contract I solves (4). Moreover, by Boonen et al. (2016)
we have that any asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (I, pi) is such that I solves (4) and
(6) pi = ρ2(I(X)) + δ
(
ρ1(X)− ρ1(X − I(X))− ρ2(I(X))
)
.
Thus, according to the third imposed criterion, for a given Pareto-optimal I, the associate premium
is induced by (6). Throughout the rest of this paper, we keep the parameter δ ∈ (0, 1) fixed. Note
that for all asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions (I, pi), the vector of risk measures (ρ1(X−I(X)+
pi), ρ2(I(X) − pi)) remains the same.
We may identify WG(I(X)) := ρ1(X)−ρ1(X− I(X))−ρ2(I(X)) ≥ 0 as the total welfare gain
from trading. The fraction δ of it is the welfare gain for the reinsurer, and the remaining faction
1 − δ of this total welfare gain is the welfare gain for the insurer. To formalize this, it holds for pi
in (6) that
ρ1(X)− ρ1(X − I(X) + pi) = (1− δ) (ρ1(X)− ρ1(X − I(X)) − ρ2(I(X))) = (1− δ)WG(I(X)),
ρ2(0)− ρ2(I(X) − pi) = δ (ρ1(X) − ρ1(X − I(X)) − ρ2(I(X))) = δWG(I(X)),
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where I ∈ I. Here, we use cash-invariance of ρ1 and ρ2. Note also that pi = ρ2(I(X))+δWG(I(X)),
and when δ → 0 or δ → 1 then the indifference premiums of the reinsurer and insurer are charged,
respectively.
Remark 2.2. It is apparent from the definition of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, that
the parameter δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the exogenously given bargaining power of the agents. Since the
Pareto-optimal loss function I solves problem (4), the bargaining power affects only the level of the
associated premium. In other words, we get directly from (6), that higher reinsurer’s bargaining
power (i.e., the level of δ) means higher premium for each optimal I. This is directly linked to the
sharing of the welfare gain between the insurer and the reinsurer, which is based on the exogenously
imposed parameter δ.
3. Preferences as Strategic Choices
In this section, we develop the argument on the proposed strategic behavior of the agents. As
mentioned in the introductory section, the main idea is that agents do have motive to strategically
choose the risk preferences (i.e., their risk measures) that they will submit to the transaction. As
we have seen in Section 2, both the reinsurance loss function I and its premium pi heavily depends
on the both agents’ risk measures. In turn, the total welfare and its sharing between the agents
hang upon the risk measures that each agent declares in the transaction. Furthermore, each of the
agents possesses (possibly not symmetric) market power since the reinsurance contract can be seen
as a specific duopoly zero-supply transaction. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that both agents
act strategically regarding the risk measure they appear to have when determining the reinsurance
contract. In this way, a Nash game is formed and its equilibrium point will induce the effective risk
measures and the associate reinsurance contract.
For any risk measure that agents declare, the reinsurance contract will be of the form of the
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, as defined in (5). More precisely, we assume that whatever
risk preferences are stated, the reinsurance loss function will be designed by the Pareto-optimal
rule, while the induced premium will be keep the same bargaining power parameter as in (9). In
other words, agents pre-agree to share the insurer’s risky portfolio in the way that optimizes the
total welfare for each strategically stated risk measures. In terms of total welfare concerns, this is a
reasonable framework, which in fact has been used in similar equilibrium models; see among others
Anthropelos and Kardaras (2017); Anthropelos (2017) and the references therein.
In short, we propose the following “game”:
1. the two agents state their risk measure ρ∗i (possibly different than ρi);
2. given the pair (ρ∗1, ρ
∗
2), the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution selects an optimal reinsur-
ance contract;
3. if this asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is not individually rational for at least one
agent, there will be no reinsurance.
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The next step is to parameterize set of admissible risk measures, that is to parameterize the
agents’ strategic sets. For this, we impose the following parameterization of ρi for both i ∈ {1, 2}:
ρi(Y ) = ρ(Y ; γi), for all Y ∈ L
∞.
Throughout this paper, we assume that (γ1, γ2) is the couple of true parameters of the two agents.
Therefore, the agents’(true) risk measures ρ1 and ρ2 belong to the same class of risk measures with
possibly different values of parameters γ1 and γ2.
Imposing the above family of risk measures implies that agents are allowed to strategically
choose the level of the parameter γi. We may assume that the domain of γi, that is the agent’s
strategic set is a closed and finite interval, normalized to [0, 1]. In order to get a further structure
on the risk measure parameterization, we impose the following properties on ρ.
Assumption 3.1. For all I ∈ I such that P(I(X) > 0) > 0, it holds that ρ(I(X); ·) is continuous,
and strictly increasing on [0, 1]. Moreover, for all γ ∈ [0, 1], ρ(·; γ) satisfies Assumption 2.1.
Intuitively, increasing with respect to γ implies that parameterization could stand for risk-
aversion coefficient, in the sense that the agent’s risk measure becomes more conservative as γ
increases. Besides that, the other good features of the chosen parameterization are its tractability
and the fact that it is consistent with the most commonly-used examples of risk measures:
Example 3.2. Let ρ(·; γ) be the distortion risk measure parameterized by distortion function
g(·; γ). If g(s; γ) is strictly increasing in γ for all s ∈ (0, 1), then the distortion risk measure ρ
satisfies Assumption 3.1. We state two different examples of such distortion risk measures. First,
let ρ be defined as:
ρ(Y ; γ) = (1− γ)E[Y ] + γρˆ(X),(7)
where ρˆ is a distortion measure with a non-linear, concave distortion function gˆ. Thus, it holds
that gˆ(s) > s for all s ∈ (0, 1). Then, ρ(·; γ) is a distortion risk measure with distortion function
g(s) = (1 − γ)s + γigˆ(s) for s ∈ [0, 1], which is strictly increasing in γ on (0, 1). For instance, we
could assume that ρˆ(Y ) = CV aRα(Y ) for some α ∈ (0, 1), that is the distortion risk measure with
distortion function g(s) = min{s/(1− α), 1} (see, e.g., Dhaene et al., 2006).
The second example is the proportional hazard transform. This is again a distortion risk
measure, where the corresponding distortion function can be scaled such that it satisfies Assumption
3.1. For instance, under risk-averse preference, the distortion function is g(s) = s1−γ for s ∈ [0, 1]
(Wang, 1995).
As stated before, for any couple of submitted parameters (ζ1, ζ2) ∈ [0, 1]
2, that is for any
submitted risk measures (ρ(·; ζ1), ρ(·; ζ2)), agents select the corresponding Pareto-optimal reinsur-
ance contract. For any pair (ζ1, ζ2) ∈ [0, 1]
2, we shall call a reinsurance contract (I, pi) ∈ I × R+,
(ζ1, ζ2)-Pareto optimal when I solves
(8) min
I∈I
ρ(X − I(X); ζ1) + ρ(I(X); ζ2).
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The following proposition characterizes the (ζ1, ζ2)-Pareto optimal reinsurance contracts within
the proposed parameterization.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that ρ satisfies Assumption 3.1. Then, (I∗, pi) is (ζ1, ζ2)-Pareto optimal
if and only if it holds almost surely that
I∗(X) =


X if ζ1 > ζ2,
Iˆ(X) if ζ1 = ζ2,
0 if ζ1 < ζ2,
where Iˆ is any function in I.
Proof. First, assume that ζ1 > ζ2. For all I ∈ I such that P(I(X) < X) > 0, we get
ρ(X − I(X); ζ1) + ρ(I(X); ζ2) > ρ(X − I(X); ζ2) + ρ(I(X); ζ2) = ρ(X; ζ2),
where the inequality is due to monotonicity of ρ(X−I(X); ·), and the equality is due to comonotonic
additivity of ρ. On the other hand, if I(X) = X almost surely, then
ρ(X − I(X); ζ1) + ρ(I(X); ζ2) = ρ(X; ζ2),
since ρ(0; ζ1) = 0. Hence, the minimum in (8) is attained if and only if I(X) = X almost surely.
The proof for the case that ζ1 < ζ2 is similar. Finally, the result for the case where ζ1 = ζ2 is
a direct consequence of comonotonic additivity of ρ(·; ζ1). 
It follows that under risk measures of the same family, if the reinsurer appears in the transaction
as relatively more risk averse, then there is no transfer of risk. On the other hand, if reinsurer
behaves less risk averse than the insurer, there is a total risk transfer to the reinsurer. If they
declare the same risk aversion, then, for every I ∈ I, the quantity of problem (8) stays the same
and equal to ρ(X; ζ1).
Regarding the premium, if agents’ submitted risk aversions are (ζ1, ζ2), the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution induces the following premium (see and compare with (6)):
pi = ρ(I∗(X); ζ2) + δ
(
ρ(X; ζ1)− ρ(X − I
∗(X); ζ1)− ρ(I
∗(X); ζ2)
)
= δ[ρ(X; ζ1)− ρ(X − I
∗(X); ζ1)] + (1− δ)ρ(I
∗(X); ζ2),(9)
for reinsuring the risk I∗(X), where I∗ ∈ I is as in Proposition 3.3. For a given pair (ζ1, ζ2), we
refer to (I∗, pi), given in Proposition 3.3 and (9), as the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. If
ζ1 < ζ2, then I
∗(X)
d
= 0 and pi = 0, and if ζ1 > ζ2, then I
∗(X)
d
= X and pi given by (9).
The risky position after reinsurance (posterior risk) for each agent will then be given by
Y1 = X − I
∗(X) + δ[ρ(X; ζ1)− ρ(X − I
∗(X); ζ1)] + (1− δ)ρ(I
∗(X); ζ2),
Y2 = I
∗(X)− δ[ρ(X; ζ1)− ρ(X − I
∗(X); ζ1)]− (1− δ)ρ(I
∗(X); ζ2).
So, after the reinsurance contract (I∗, pi) is traded, the insurer is endowed with Y1 and the reinsurer is
endowed with Y2. Note that the posterior risk is evaluated by the agents using the true preferences,
that is the measures ρ(·; γi) are applied.
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In other words, for any pair (ζ1, ζ2), provided that ζ1 6= ζ2, Proposition 3.3 and pricing rule
(9) determine a unique reinsurance contract. We now clarify the case when ζ1 = ζ2, which will
be proven to be quite interesting in our set-up. Note that when risk aversions are equal, the
comonotonic additivity implies that the welfare gains are zero. Proposition 3.3 states that any
Iˆ(X) with Iˆ ∈ I yields (ζ1, ζ2)-Pareto optimality. We differentiate two cases. Firstly, we let
2
ζ1 = ζ2 ∈ [γ2, γ1], which thus implies γ1 ≥ γ2. By monotonicity of ρ(X − I(X); ·) and comonotonic
additivity of ρ(·; ζ1), it holds for all Iˆ ∈ I and ζ1 = ζ2 ≤ γ1 that:
ρ(Y1; γ1) = ρ(X − Iˆ(X); γ1) + δ[ρ(X; ζ1)− ρ(X − Iˆ(X); ζ1)] + (1− δ)ρ(Iˆ(X); ζ2)
= ρ(X − Iˆ(X); γ1) + δ(ρ(Iˆ(X); ζ1) + (1 − δ)ρ(Iˆ(X); ζ2)
= ρ(X − Iˆ(X); γ1) + ρ(Iˆ(X); ζ1)
≥ ρ(X − Iˆ(X); ζ1) + ρ(Iˆ(X); ζ1)
= ρ(X; ζ1),
and if Iˆ ∈ I and ζ1 = ζ1 ≥ γ2 then
ρ(Y2; γ2) = ρ(Iˆ(X); γ2)− δ[ρ(X; ζ1)− ρ(X − Iˆ(X); ζ1)]− (1− δ)ρ(Iˆ(X); ζ2)
= ρ(Iˆ(X); γ2)− ρ(Iˆ(X); ζ2))
= ρ(X; γ2)− ρ(X; ζ2))− [ρ(X − Iˆ(X); γ2)− ρ(X − Iˆ(X); ζ2))]
≥ ρ(X; γ2)− ρ(X; ζ2).
Hence, if ζ1 = ζ2 and also γ2 ≤ ζi ≤ γ1, it is optimal for both agents to select the indemnity
Iˆ(X) = X, which means that Y1 = ρ(X; ζ1) and also yields the premium pi = ρ(X; ζ1) from (9).
Secondly, we check the case where ζ1 = ζ2 /∈ [γ2, γ1], where it is easily shown that at least one
agent is strictly better off in case Iˆ(X) = 0 (no risk-sharing), which yields the premium pi = 0 from
(9). Summing up, we have shown the following corollary of Proposition 3.3.
Corollary 3.4. Suppose that ρ satisfies Assumption 3.1. Then, for any pair (ζ1, ζ2) ∈ [0, 1]
2, (I∗, pi)
is the unique (ζ1, ζ2)-Pareto optimal if and only if it holds almost surely that
(10) I∗(X) =
{
X if ζ1 > ζ2 or ζ1 = ζ2 ∈ [γ2, γ1],
0 otherwise,
and pi as in (9).
2Here, we say that if γ1 < γ2, then [γ2, γ1] = ∅.
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For I∗ and pi as above, welfare gains of the insurer and the reinsurer are:
WˆG1(ζ1, ζ2) := ρ(X; γ1)− ρ(Y1; γ1)
= ρ(X; γ1)− ρ(X − I
∗(X); γ1)− ρ(I
∗(X); ζ2)
− δ
(
ρ(X; ζ1)− ρ(X − I
∗(X); ζ1)− ρ(I
∗(X); ζ2)
)
,
WˆG2(ζ1, ζ2) := ρ(0; γ2)− ρ(Y2; γ2)
= −ρ(I∗(X); γ2) + ρ(I
∗(X); ζ2) + δ
(
ρ(X; ζ1)− ρ(X − I
∗(X); ζ1)− ρ(I
∗(X); ζ2)
)
.
Substituting I∗ from (10) yields:
WˆG1(ζ1, ζ2) =
{
ρ(X; γ1)− (1− δ)ρ(X; ζ2)− δρ(X; ζ1) if ζ1 > ζ2 or ζ1 = ζ2 ∈ [γ2, γ1],
0 otherwise,
WˆG2(ζ1, ζ2) =
{
−ρ(X; γ2) + (1− δ)ρ(X; ζ2) + δρ(X; ζ1) if ζ1 > ζ2 or ζ1 = ζ2 ∈ [γ2, γ1],
0 otherwise.
The total welfare gains from trading are then given by
WˆG1(ζ1, ζ2) + WˆG2(ζ1, ζ2) = ρ(X; γ1)− ρ(X − I
∗(X); γ1)− ρ(I
∗(X); γ2),(11)
where I∗ is given in (10). The right hand side of (11) depends on (ζ1, ζ2) only via I
∗. Note that
(11) is equal to ρ(X; γ1) −minI∈I{ρ(X − I(X); γ1) + ρ(I(X); γ2)} when (ζ1, ζ2) is ordered in the
same way as (γ1, γ2). Moreover, if γ1 > γ2 and ζ1 > ζ2 or ζ1 = ζ2 ∈ [γ2, γ1], then the value of (11)
is strictly positive.
In the third and last step of the game, the agents decide whether or not to accept the proposed
deal. Including this third step via individual rationality constraints leads to the following welfare
gains after bargaining:
WGi(ζ1, ζ2) :=
{
WˆGi(ζ1, ζ2) if WˆG1(ζ1, ζ2) ≥ 0 and WˆG2(ζ1, ζ2) ≥ 0,
0 otherwise,
(12)
for all i ∈ {1, 2}.
We next provide an example of the functions WG1 and WG2.
Example 3.5. Let the preferences be given by ρ(Y ; γi) = (1 − γi)E[Y ] + γiCV aR99%(Y ), δ =
4/5, and assume that X is exponentially distributed with parameter 1. Then, we readily get
ρ(X; γi) = (1− γi) · 1+ γi(1+F
−1
X (99%)) = 1+ γi ln(100). So, ρ(X; ·) is an affine function. Assume
2/3 = γ1 > γ2 = 1/3. We find that WG(X) = ρ(X; γ1) − ρ(X; γ2) = ln(100)/3. We display the
joint strategies where the functions WG1 and WG2 are not both zero in Figure 1. In that case, we
find
WG1(ζ1, ζ2) = (γ1 − (1− δ)ζ2 − δζ1) ln(100) = (
2
3 −
1
5ζ2 −
4
5ζ1) ln(100),
WG2(ζ1, ζ2) = (−γ2 + (1− δ)ζ2 + δζ1) ln(100) = (−
1
3 +
1
5ζ2 +
4
5ζ1) ln(100),
where (ζ1, ζ2) ∈ [0, 1]
2 is in the shaded area in Figure 1.
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WG1(ζ1, ζ2) =WG2(ζ1, ζ2) = 0
ζ 2
→
ζ1 →0
γ2
γ1
1
γ2 γ1 1
Figure 1. Graphical illustration of WGi as function of (ζ1, ζ2) ∈ [0, 1]
2, corre-
sponding to Example 3.5. The functional form is shown in Example 3.5. Only in the
shaded area, it holds that WGi(ζ1, ζ2) 6= 0 for at least one i ∈ {1, 2}. Moreover, on
this shaded area, WG1(ζ1, ζ2) is strictly decreasing in ζ1 and ζ2, while WG2(ζ1, ζ2)
is strictly increasing in ζ1 and ζ2.
4. Nash Equilibrium
Having defined the agents’ gains for each pair of strategic choices (ζ1, ζ2), we are in the position
to formulate the associate Nash equilibrium.
Definition 4.1. A Nash equilibrium is defined as a pair (γ∗1 , γ
∗
2) ∈ [0, 1]
2 such that
γ∗1 ∈ argmax
ζ1∈[0,1]
WG1(ζ1, γ
∗
2),
γ∗2 ∈ argmax
ζ2∈[0,1]
WG2(γ
∗
1 , ζ2),
where WG1 and WG2 are defined in (12).
As stated above, for a Nash equilibrium pair (γ∗1 , γ
∗
2) ∈ [0, 1]
2, the induced equilibrium rein-
surance contract is given by (10) and (6).
Proposition 3.3 also implies that under true risk preferences (i.e., when agents do not act
strategically), if γ1 < γ2, then the Pareto-optimal contract (I
∗(X), pi) = (0, 0). So, there does
not exist a contract in which both the insurer and reinsurer strictly gain more than the status
quo. In other words, when the reinsurer’s true risk aversion is higher than the risk aversion of the
insurer, there is no mutually agreeable transfer of risk. Corollary 3.4 states that the same holds
even when agents strategically choose their risk aversion parameter. Combining this observation
with the previous discussion we get that the following result.
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Proposition 4.2. Suppose that ρ satisfies Assumption 3.1. If γ1 ≤ γ2, then any (γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) ∈ [0, 1]
2
is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let γ1 ≤ γ2. If γ
∗
1 > γ
∗
2 or γ
∗
1 = γ
∗
2 ∈ [γ2, γ1], we get
WˆG1(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) + WˆG2(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) = ρ(X; γ1)− ρ(X; γ2) ≤ 0,
and otherwise WˆG1(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) + WˆG2(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) = 0 + 0 = 0. Hence, for all (γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) ∈ [0, 1]
2 it holds
that WˆG1(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) > 0 implies WˆG2(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) < 0, and so we have WG1(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) = 0. Thus, for any
γ∗2 ∈ [0, 1], it holds that WG1(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) = 0. So, argmaxζ1∈[0,1]WG1(ζ1, γ
∗
2) = [0, 1]. Likewise, it
holds argmaxζ2∈[0,1]WG2(γ
∗
1 , ζ2) = [0, 1] for all γ
∗
1 ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, for all (γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) ∈ [0, 1]
2, it holds
γ∗1 ∈ argmaxζ1∈[0,1]WG1(ζ1, γ
∗
2) and γ
∗
2 ∈ argmaxζ2∈[0,1]WG2(γ
∗
1 , ζ2). Hence, any (γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) ∈ [0, 1]
2
is a Nash equilibrium. 
Hence, if γ1 ≤ γ2, then the Nash equilibrium leads to a contract where both agents do not
improve their position compared to the status quo. In other words, it holds for the Nash equilibrium
(γ∗1 , γ
∗
2) ∈ [0, 1]
2 that WG1(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) =WG2(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) = 0 and a corresponding reinsurance contract is
given by I(X)
d
= 0 and pi = 0: no reinsurance (which is actually the case even without strategic
behavior).
Therefore, in the sequel of this paper, we only focus on the case where γ1 > γ2. We first define
the value3
Γ1 := inf{ζ1 ∈ [0, 1] : WˆG1(ζ, 0) < 0},
which stands for the threshold so that if ζ1 > Γ1, then the insurer will never accept the reinsurance
contract, irrespective of the reinsurer’s strategy. We then, for any ζ1 ∈ (γ1,Γ1], define the function
f2(ζ1) = max{ζ2 ∈ [0, ζ1] : WˆG1(ζ1, ζ2) ≥ 0}
= max{ζ2 ∈ [0, ζ1] : ρ(X; γ1)− (1− δ)ρ(X; ζ2)− δρ(X; ζ1) ≥ 0}.
Note that f2 is the response function on the domain (γ1,Γ1] that sets the insurer at indifference,
i.e., WˆG1(ζ1, f2(ζ1)) = 0. This follows from the fact that WˆG1(ζ1, ·) is strictly decreasing and
continuous, WˆG1(ζ1, 0) ≥ 0 for γ
∗
1 ≤ Γ1, and WˆG1(ζ1, ζ1) < 0 since ζ1 > γ1. Since ρ(X; ·)
is assumed monotone, it holds that f2 is a strictly decreasing function on the domain (γ1,Γ1].
Symmetrically, we define
f1(ζ2) = min{ζ1 ∈ [ζ2, 1] : WˆG2(ζ1, ζ2) ≥ 0},
for all ζ2 ∈ [Γ2, γ2), where Γ2 := sup{ζ2 ∈ [0, 1] : WˆG2(1, ζ2) < 0}.
The following lemma allows to clarify the values of the agents’ best-response functions.
3We say that inf{∅} =∞ and sup{∅} = −∞.
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Lemma 4.3. Let γ1 > γ2, and ρ satisfy Assumption 3.1. Then, for all ζ1 ∈ [0, 1], it holds that
argmax
ζ′
2
∈[0,1]
WG2(ζ1, ζ
′
2) =


[0, 1] if ζ1 ≤ γ2,
ζ1 if ζ1 ∈ (γ2, γ1],
f2(ζ1) if ζ1 ∈ (γ1,Γ1],
[0, 1] if ζ1 > Γ1,
(13)
and for all ζ2 ∈ [0, 1], it holds that
argmax
ζ′
1
∈[0,1]
WG1(ζ
′
1, ζ2) =


[0, 1] if ζ2 < Γ2,
f1(ζ2) if ζ2 ∈ [Γ2, γ2],
ζ2 if ζ2 ∈ [γ2, γ1),
[0, 1] if ζ2 ≥ γ1.
(14)
Proof. We only prove (13), as the proof of (14) is similar and thus omitted. The risk measure
ρ(X; ζ2) is increasing in ζ2 by Assumption 3.1. On the domain [0, ζ1), we have that WˆG2(ζ1, ·) is
strictly increasing. On the domain (ζ1, 1], we have that WˆG2(ζ1, ·) = 0. Moreover, WˆG2(ζ1, ζ1) = 0
when ζ1 ∈ [0, 1]\[γ2, γ1].
We distinguish four cases. In the first case, we let ζ1 ∈ [0, γ2]. We show that any strategy by
agent 2 yields a welfare gain of 0. If ζ2 > ζ1, then (I
∗(X), pi) = (0, 0) is (ζ1, ζ2)-Pareto optimal,
which yields WG2(ζ1, ζ2) = WˆG2(ζ1, ζ2) = 0. Thus, it is sufficient to show that WˆG2(ζ1, ζ2) ≤ 0
for all ζ2 ≤ ζ1. This follows from the fact that WˆG2(ζ1, ·) is strictly increasing on [0, ζ1] and
WˆG2(ζ1, ζ1) = −ρ(X; γ2) + ρ(X; ζ1) ≤ −ρ(X; γ2) + ρ(X; γ2) = 0,
when ζ1 ≤ γ2, which follows from the fact that ρ(X; γ) is increasing in γ. Thus, it holds that
WG2(ζ1, ζ2) = 0 for all ζ2 ∈ [0, 1], and thus argmaxζ2∈[0,1]WG2(ζ1, ζ2) = [0, 1].
As the second case, we let ζ1 ∈ (γ2, γ1]. We need to show that WˆG1(ζ1, ζ1) ≥ 0 and
WˆG2(ζ1, ζ1) > 0. This follows directly from
WˆG1(ζ1, ζ1) = ρ(X; γ1)− ρ(X; ζ1) ≥ ρ(X; ζ1)− ρ(X; ζ1) = 0,
WˆG2(ζ1, ζ1) = −ρ(X; γ2) + ρ(X; ζ1) > −ρ(X; γ2) + ρ(X; γ2) = 0,
which follows from ζ1 > γ2 and the fact that ρ(X; γ) is strictly increasing in γ.
As the third case, we let ζ1 ∈ (γ1,Γ1]. The function WˆG1(ζ1, ·) = ρ(X; γ1) − (1 − δ)ρ(X; ·) −
δρ(X; ζ1) is strictly decreasing on (0, ζ1) and the function WˆG2(ζ1, ·) = −ρ(X; γ2)+(1−δ)ρ(X; ·)+
δρ(X; ζ1) is strictly increasing on (0, ζ1). Agent 2 solves
max
ζ2∈[0,1]
WˆG2(ζ1, ζ2), s.t. WˆG1(ζ1, ζ2) ≥ 0,
which is thus equal to
max{ζ2 ∈ [0, ζ1] : WˆG1(ζ1, ζ2) ≥ 0} = f2(ζ1).
We now only need to show that WG2(ζ1, f2(ζ1)) > 0, which implies that there exists a ζ2 ∈ [0, 1]
such that WˆG1(ζ1, ζ2) ≥ 0 and WˆG2(ζ1, ζ2) > 0. Since ζ1 ≤ Γ1 and since WˆG1(·, 0) is continuous
by continuity of ρ, it holds that WˆG1(ζ1, 0) ≥ 0. Moreover, by monotonicity of ρ(X; ·), it follows
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that
WˆG2(ζ1, 0) = −ρ(X; γ2) + (1− δ)ρ(X; 0) + δρ(X; ζ1) > −ρ(X; γ2) + (1− δ)ρ(X; γ2) + δρ(X; γ2) = 0,
which concludes the proof that argmaxζ2∈[0,1]WG2(ζ1, ζ2) = f2(ζ1) when ζ1 ∈ (γ1,Γ1].
As the fourth and last case, we let ζ1 ∈ (Γ1, 1]. Of course, this case is only relevant when
Γ1 < 1. Since ζ1 > Γ1 and since WˆG1(·, 0) is strictly decreasing, it holds that WˆG1(ζ1, 0) < 0. For
all ζ2 < ζ1, it holds that
WˆG1(ζ1, ζ2) = ρ(X; γ1)− (1− δ)ρ(X; ζ2)− δρ(X; ζ1)
< ρ(X; γ1)− (1− δ)ρ(X; 0) − δρ(X; ζ1) = WˆG1(ζ1, 0) < 0.
Moreover, for all ζ2 ≥ ζ1, (I
∗(X), pi) = (0, 0) is (ζ1, ζ2)-Pareto optimal, and thus WˆG2(ζ1, ζ2) = 0.
Hence, for all ζ2 ∈ [0, 1], it holds that WˆG1(ζ1, ζ2) < 0 or WˆG2(ζ1, ζ2) = 0, and thus WG2(ζ1, ζ2) =
0. Hence, we have argmaxζ2∈[0,1]WG2(ζ1, ζ2) = [0, 1]. This concludes the proof. 
If ζ1 > Γ1 and ζ2 < Γ2, then WˆGi(ζ1, ζ2) < 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2}. This is a violation of Pareto
optimality of (I, pi) = (X,pi). Thus, at most one of the inequalities Γ1 < 1 and Γ2 > 0 hold. An
example of the best-response correspondences in Lemma 4.3 is provided in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Graphical illustration of the best-response correspondences
argmaxζ′
2
∈[0,1]WG2(ζ1, ζ
′
2) (left graph) and argmaxζ′1∈[0,1]WG1(ζ
′
1, ζ2) (right
graph), corresponding to the setting in Example 3.5. The best-respondences are
plotted against the parameter ζi ∈ [0, 1] of the other agent. The functional form is
shown in (13) and (14). Here, we find Γ1 = 5/6, and Γ2 = −∞. A solid line means
that the line itself constitutes the best-responses, while a dotted line means that
the line itself does not constitutes the best-responses.
Based on the Lemma 4.3, we can identify which the set of Nash equilibria is.
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Theorem 4.4. Let γ1 > γ2, and ρ satisfy Assumption 3.1. A set of Nash equilibria is given by
(15) {(γ∗1 , γ
∗
2) : γ
∗
1 ∈ [0, γ2] ∪ (Γ1, 1], γ
∗
2 ∈ [0,Γ2) ∪ [γ1, 0]} ∪ {(γ, γ) : γ ∈ [γ2, γ1]}.
Proof. From (13) and (14), we immediately get that γ ∈ argmaxζ1∈[0,1]WG1(ζ1, γ) and γ ∈
argmaxζ2∈[0,1]WG2(γ, ζ2) for all γ ∈ [γ2, γ1]. Thus, (γ, γ) is a Nash equilibrium for any γ ∈
[γ2, γ1]. If γ
∗
1 ∈ [0, γ2] ∪ (Γ1, 1] and γ
∗
2 ∈ [0,Γ2) ∪ [γ1, 0], then we get again from Lemma 4.3
that argmaxζ2∈[0,1]WG2(γ
∗
1 , ζ2) = argmaxζ1∈[0,1]WG1(ζ1, γ
∗
2) = [0, 1]. Therefore, we have that
γ∗2 ∈ argmaxζ2∈[0,1]WG2(γ
∗
1 , ζ2) and γ
∗
1 ∈ argmaxζ1∈[0,1]WG1(ζ1, γ
∗
2), and thus (γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) is a Nash
equilibrium. So, the set (15) is a set of Nash equilibria. 
We display an example of Nash equilibria in Figure 3.
γ
∗ 2
→
γ∗1 →
0
γ2
γ1
Γ1
1
γ2 γ1 1
Figure 3. Graphical illustration of Nash equilibria if 2/3 = γ1 > γ2 = 1/3, Γ1 =
5/6, and Γ2 = −∞. These Nash equilibria are given in (15). A solid line means
that the line itself constitutes Nash equilibria, while a dotted line means that the
line itself does not constitutes Nash equilibria.
We get directly from the comonotonic additivity that for any γ ∈ [γ2, γ1], the allocation of the
welfare gains between the insurer and the reinsurer is
WG1(γ, γ) = WˆG1(γ, γ) = ρ(X; γ1)− ρ(X; γ) ≥ 0,(16)
WG2(γ, γ) = WˆG2(γ, γ) = ρ(X; γ) − ρ(X; γ2) ≥ 0,(17)
It follows that for γ ∈ (γ2, γ1), the Nash equilibrium (γ, γ) induces a reinsurance contract that
yields a strict improvement compared to the status quo for both agents. Theorem 4.4 selects some
Nash equilibria, but not necessarily all of them. The next result shows that for all Nash equilibria
not in (15), both agents are indifferent compared to the status quo, in other words we determine all
Nash equilibria in which at least one agent strictly benefits. In fact, we show that at equilibrium
agents appear as having the same risk aversion parameters.
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Theorem 4.5. Let γ1 > γ2, and ρ satisfy Assumption 3.1. The set of Nash equilibria (γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) in
which there exists an i ∈ {1, 2} for which WGi(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) > 0 is given by
(18) {(γ, γ) : γ ∈ [γ2, γ1]}.
Proof. From Theorem 4.4 it follows that the set (18) is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria. From
(16)-(17) and Assumption 3.1, it follows that all elements of the set (18) yield a contract for which
at least one agent has a strictly positive welfare gain. So, in this proof, we only need to show that
there does not exist another Nash equilibrium (γ∗1 , γ
∗
2) in which there exists an i ∈ {1, 2} for which
WGi(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) > 0.
Suppose that (γ∗1 , γ
∗
2) ∈ [0, 1]
2 is a Nash equilibrium that is not in (18), but withWG2(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) >
0. It then holds that WˆG1(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) ≥ 0 and WˆG2(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) > 0. Then, we get from the definition
of WˆG2 that γ
∗
1 > γ
∗
2 or γ
∗
1 = γ
∗
2 ∈ [γ2, γ1]. Since (γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) is not in (18), it must hold γ
∗
1 > γ
∗
2 .
Since WˆG1(·, γ
∗
2) = ρ(X; γ1)− (1− δ)ρ(X; γ
∗
2 )− δρ(X; ·) is strictly decreasing on and WˆG2(·, γ
∗
2) =
−ρ(X; γ2) + (1 − δ)ρ(X; γ
∗
2 ) + δρ(X; ·) is continuous on (γ
∗
2 , 1] by Assumption 3.1, there exists a
ζ1 ∈ (γ
∗
2 , γ
∗
1) such that WˆG1(ζ1, γ
∗
2) > WˆG1(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) ≥ 0 and WˆG2(ζ1, γ
∗
2) ≥ 0. So, WG1(ζ1, γ
∗
2) >
WˆG1(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) = WG1(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2). Hence, ζ1 is a better response than γ
∗
1 for agent 1, which is a
contradiction with the assumption that (γ∗1 , γ
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium.
The proof that there does not exist a Nash equilibrium (γ∗1 , γ
∗
2) ∈ [0, 1]
2 with WG1(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) > 0
which is not in (18) is similar, and thus omitted. 
Note that for the Nash equilibria (γ, γ) with γ ∈ [γ2, γ1], the corresponding reinsurance contract
(I, pi) is (γ1, γ2)-Pareto optimal (i.e., it coincides with the Pareto optimal without the strategic
behavior). The latter follows from the fact that I solves (4) (see Theorem 3.1 of Asimit and Boonen,
2018). Hence, if there is some reinsurance contract that strictly benefits at least one of the agents
(which holds when γ1 > γ2), we have shown that (18) is the set of Pareto optimal Nash equilibria.
The exact choice of the common risk parameter at the equilibrium does not affect the contract but
only the premium and hence the individual welfare gains, or in other words the allocation of the
total welfare gain between them (larger γ means higher premium paid by the insurer and hence
more gain for the reinsurer).
Remark 4.6. It is important to emphasize that under the Nash equilibria (γ, γ) with γ ∈ [γ2, γ1],
the exogenous choice of δ is irrelevant for the reinsurance contract (I, pi). In other words, the Nash
equilibrium game on the risk aversion coefficient transfers the market power to the exact choice of
the common submitted risk aversion γ. This is a significant feature of the proposed equilibrium
model, since the agent’s market power is now determined within the equilibrium and not as an
exogenous parameter.
4.1. Stackelberg equilibrium. In the discussion above, we showed that even the Nash equilibria
that strictly increase the agents’ welfare are usually non-unique. One way to select a particular one
could be through the concept of the Stackelberg equilibrium. It turns out that in our setting the
Stackelberg equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium.
More precisely, we have seen that the Nash equilibrium which yields improvement of the status
quo is when agents appear homogeneous with respect to their submitted risk aversions. We also
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have seen that there is monotonicity of the gains’ allocation with respect to the common equilibrium
risk aversion (higher γ, higher gain to the reinsurer). Therefore, the determination of a unique Nash
equilibrium is equivalent to the determination of the common γ.
According to the Stackelberg equilibrium, one of the two agents moves first (called the leader),
and submits his parameter within the strategic set. Thereafter, the other agent (called the follower)
observes this parameter, and responds by stating his best response in an optimal way. In other
words, the leader of the game decides on an optimal strategy while taking into consideration the
optimal response strategies of the follower4. Below, we state the formal definition of the Stackelberg
equilibrium within our Nash equilibrium setting.
Definition 4.7. The strategy profile (γ∗1 , γ
∗
2) ∈ [0, 1]
2 is a Stackelberg equilibrium when:
• if the insurer is the leader and the reinsurer the follower, then
γ∗2 ∈ argmax
ζ2∈[0,1]
WG2(γ
∗
1 , ζ2),
and there is no other pair (γˆ1, γˆ2) such that
γˆ2 ∈ argmax
ζ2∈[0,1]
WG2(γˆ1, ζ2) and WG1(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) < WG1(γˆ1, γˆ2);
• if the reinsurer is the leader and the insurer the follower, then
γ∗1 ∈ argmax
ζ1∈[0,1]
WG1(ζ1, γ
∗
2),
and there is no other pair (γˆ1, γˆ2) such that
γˆ1 ∈ argmax
ζ1∈[0,1]
WG1(ζ1, γˆ2) and WG2(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) < WG2(γˆ1, γˆ2).
We have seen in Theorem 4.9 that the Nash equilibrium with strict improvement is the one
that each agent mimics the strategy of the other. If the leader of the transaction takes this into
account, the following lemma describes his optimal decision.
Lemma 4.8. If γ1 > γ2, the following statements hold:
• argmaxγ∈[0,1]WG2(γ, γ) is single-valued and given by γ1;
• argmaxγ∈[0,1]WG1(γ, γ) is single-valued and given by γ2.
Proof. We show the first result, and the proof of the second result is similar and thus omitted. If
γ < γ2 then WˆG2(γ, γ) < 0, and if γ > γ1 then WˆG1(γ, γ) < 0. So, since WG2(γ, γ) ≥ 0 for all
γ ∈ [0, 1], we get by construction that
max
γ∈[0,1]
WG2(γ, γ) = max
γ∈[γ2,γ1]
WG2(γ, γ).
4Similar equilibrium argument has been applied in Chen and Shen (2018), where the role of the leader is given to the
reinsurer.
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From (16)-(17) and monotonicity of ρ(X; ·), it follows that WˆG1(γ, γ) ≥ 0 and WˆG2(γ, γ) ≥ 0 for
all γ ∈ [γ2, γ1], and thus
max
γ∈[γ2,γ1]
WG2(γ, γ) = max
γ∈[γ2,γ1]
WˆG2(γ, γ) = max
γ∈[γ2,γ1]
−ρ(X; γ2) + ρ(X; γ).
By monotonicity of ρ(X; ·), there is only one maximizer, and in fact equal to γ1. Therefore,
argmaxγ∈[0,1]WG2(γ, γ) is single-valued and given by γ1. This concludes the proof. 
A description of the Stackelberg equilibria is stated in the following theorem, where Lemma
4.8 is used.
Theorem 4.9. Let γ1 > γ2. Then, the following statements hold:
• if the insurer is the leader, the Stackelberg equilibrium is given by (γ2, γ2) and all welfare
gain goes to the insurer;
• if the reinsurer is the leader, the Stackelberg equilibrium is given by (γ1, γ1) and all the
welfare gain goes to the reinsurer.
Proof. Let first the insurer be the leader and the reinsurer be the follower. If γ1 > γ2, then
it follows from Corollary 3.4 that ˆWG1(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) + WˆG2(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) is positive, and the same for all
γ∗1 > γ
∗
2 or γ
∗
1 = γ
∗
2 ∈ [γ2, γ1]. Moreover, we readily verify that WˆG2(γ2, γ2) = 0 and γ2 ∈
argmaxζ2∈[0,1]WG2(γ2, ζ2), and thus (γ2, γ2) yields a Stackelberg equilibrium with WG1(γ2, γ2) >
0. The question now is whether there are more Stackelberg equilibria. In order words, does
there exist (γ1, γ
∗
2) ∈ [0, 1]
2 such that γ∗1 > γ
∗
2 or γ
∗
1 = γ
∗
2 ∈ [γ2, γ1] with WˆG2(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) = 0 and
γ∗2 ∈ argmaxζ2∈[0,1]WG2(γ
∗
1 , ζ2)?
We distinguish five different choices of γ∗1 ∈ [0, 1]. First, if γ
∗
1 ∈ [0, γ2), then we showed in the
proof of Lemma 4.3 that WˆG2(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) < 0 for all γ
∗
2 ∈ [0, γ
∗
1 ].Thus, there cannot exist a Stackelberg
equilibrium (γ∗1 , γ
∗
2) with γ
∗
1 ∈ [0, γ2).
Second, if γ∗1 = γ2, it follows from the fact that WˆG2(γ2, ·) is strictly increasing on [0, γ2] and
WˆG2(γ2, γ2) = 0, that WˆG2(γ2, γ
∗
2) < 0 for all γ
∗
2 ∈ [0, γ2). Moreover, by definition, it holds that
WG1(γ2, γ
∗
2) = 0 for all γ
∗
2 ∈ (γ2, 1]. Thus, the only Stackelberg equilibrium (γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) with γ
∗
1 = γ2
is (γ2, γ2).
Third, if γ∗1 ∈ (γ2, γ1], then we get from Lemma 4.3 that argmaxζ2∈[0,1]WG2(γ
∗
1 , ζ2) = γ
∗
1 .
From Lemma 4.8, we get that WG1(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
1) < WG1(γ2, γ2), and thus the insurer better plays the
strategy γ∗1 = γ2, which implies that there cannot exist a Stackelberg equilibrium (γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) with
γ∗1 ∈ (γ2, γ1].
Fourth, if γ∗1 ∈ (γ1,Γ1], then we get from Lemma 4.3 that argmaxζ2∈[0,1]WG2(γ
∗
1 , ζ2) = f2(γ
∗
1).
This implies that WˆG1(γ
∗
1 , f2(γ
∗
1)) = 0 < WG1(γ2, γ2). Hence, the insurer chooses the strategy
γ∗1 = γ2, which implies that there cannot exist a Stackelberg equilibrium (γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) with γ
∗
1 ∈ [γ1,Γ1].
Fifth and last, if γ∗1 ∈ (Γ1, 1], then we showed in the proof of Lemma 4.3 that WˆG1(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) ≤
WˆG1(γ
∗
1 , 0) < 0 for all γ
∗
2 ∈ [0, γ
∗
1 ).Thus, there cannot exist a Stackelberg equilibrium (γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) with
γ∗1 ∈ (Γ1, 1]. This concludes the proof that the only Stackelberg equilibrium is (γ2, γ2) when the
insurer is the leader and the reinsurer is the follower. The proof of the second result is similar, and
thus omitted. 
NASH EQUILIBRIA IN OPTIMAL REINSURANCE BARGAINING 19
We may now sum up how the situation is formed under the Stackelberg equilibrium argument.
We first recall that if γ1 ≤ γ2, there is no contract that yields Pareto improvement to the status quo.
For all (γ∗1 , γ
∗
2) ∈ [0, 1]
2, we have that WGi(γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) = 0, and thus every (γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2) ∈ [0, 1]
2 constitutes
a Stackelberg equilibrium. On the other hand, if γ1 > γ2, then we get from (9), (10), and Theorem
4.9 that there is full insurance in the Stackelberg equilibrium: I∗(X) = X, with the premium given
by
pi =
{
ρ(X; γ2) if the insurer is the leader,
ρ(X; γ1) if the reinsurer is the leader.
This constitutes a Nash equilibrium, where the leader extracts all welfare gain of the risk-transfer
making the follower indifferent between this transaction and the status quo (no reinsurance). Indeed,
we readily get that under that premium, the welfare gain of the leader is ρ(X; γ1) − ρ(X; γ2) and
zero for the follower.
Taking into account the discussion after Theorem 4.4, we conclude that the unique Stackelberg
equilibrium could be seen as an extreme one, in the sense that all the gain is given to the leader. We
emphasize again that the parameter δ does not affect the transaction anymore (recall Remark 4.6),
which means that under Stackelberg equilibrium all the market power is transferred to the leader,
even if his exogenously given bargaining power δ or 1− δ is low. This is an important coincidence
of the strategic behavior with respect to the agents’ risk aversion, which could heavily change the
induced welfare gains.
4.2. On welfare gains. Since agents play a game for the determination of the reinsurance contract,
it is expected that the total welfare gain is less when compared with the non-strategic situation.
It turns our however, that this is not the case in our game, which means that under social welfare
terms, the Nash equilibrium is again optimal. The only feature that heavily changes is the premium
and hence the agents’ individual welfare gain.
More precisely, when agents do not act strategically, the Pareto-optimal contract is given by
Proposition 3.3, while the premium pi by (6) (with ζi = γi). In particular, when γ1 < γ2 there is
no reinsurance, while when γ1 ≥ γ2 we readily calculate that the corresponding welfare (optimal)
gains are given by
WGo1 = (1− δ)(ρ(X; γ1)− ρ(X; γ2)),
WGo2 = δ(ρ(X; γ1)− ρ(X; γ2)).
Note that in contrast to the Nash equilibrium, the individual gains do depend clearly on the
bargaining power δ.
On the other hand, we have seen that the strictly beneficial Nash equilibria are the ones with
a common equilibrium risk parameter γ∗ ∈ [γ2, γ1] and the individual welfare gains become
WG1(γ
∗, γ∗) = ρ(X; γ1)− ρ(X; γ
∗),
WG2(γ
∗, γ∗) = ρ(X; γ∗)− ρ(X; γ2).
Therefore, although the total welfare after the transaction is the same with and without the game
on risk preferences, its allocation between agents may change dramatically.
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Note that γ∗ ∈ [γ2, γ1] can be chosen such that WG
o
i = WGi(γ
∗, γ∗) for all i ∈ {1, 2}, i.e.,
both equilibria will be the same, however this is a very special case. This is because the underlying
concept of δ as bargaining power of the reinsurer does not work in the Nash equilibrium game, where
the agent who wins more after the transaction depends on who has a better position in choosing
γ∗. As mentioned before, Stackelberg equilibrium is just an extreme case, where the leader gets it
all.
Example 4.10. We return to Example 3.5. Recall WG(X) = ln(100)/3. We derive that
WG1(γ
∗, γ∗) =
γ1 − γ
∗
γ1 − γ2
WG(X) = (23 − γ
∗) ln(100),
WG2(γ
∗, γ∗) =
γ∗ − γ2
γ1 − γ2
WG(X) = (γ∗ − 13) ln(100).
Note that only when δ = (γ∗− γ2)/(γ1− γ2) = 3γ
∗− 1, (or equivalent when γ∗ is chosen such that
γ∗ = (1 + δ)/3), we have WGoi =WGi(γ
∗, γ∗) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
4.3. A remark on strict monotonicity of ρ. We recall that in Assumption 3.1, we ask the risk
measure ρ to be strictly increasing in γ. Suppose, we only require ρ(I(X); ·) to be increasing, which
holds for instance when
ρ(I(X); γ) = V aRγ(I(X)) := inf{x ∈ R : P(I(X) ≤ x) ≥ γ}
or ρ(I(X); γ) = CV aRγ(I(X)), where I ∈ I, γ ∈ [0, 1], and where CV aRα(I(X)) is defined in
Example 3.2. Then, all insurance contracts stated in Proposition 3.3 are still Pareto optimal, but
there may be more Pareto optimal contracts. As a result, the correspondence in Lemma 4.3 is
now only a subset of the best-response correspondence. As a result, the Nash equilibria stated in
Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 4.4 are still Nash equilibria. Moreover, the set in (18) is now a set of
Nash equilibria where at least one agent profits compared to the status quo, but it is not necessarily
consisting of all such Nash equilibria. Likewise, a set of Stackelberg equilibria is given in Theorem
4.9, but there may be more. To summarize, all results of this paper except the uniqueness would
hold true.
5. Conclusion
This paper introduces a strategic behavior in reinsurance transactions that is based on the
argument that both agents have motive to strategically choose the risk preferences that they will
appear to have in the transaction. Following the related literature on thin financial markets and
non-competitive risk-sharing, we formulate a game according to which agents agree to apply the
Pareto-optimal sharing rule for any risk preferences they submit. For the agents’ strategic set, we
impose a parameterization of the (monotone and comonotonic additive) risk measures that allows
us to interpret the agents’ choice as a risk-aversion coefficient. In fact, almost all the well-known
risk measures are consistent with this parameterization.
After proving the well-posedness of the best-response problem, we show that, at the strictly
beneficial Nash equilibrium, agents appear homogeneous with respect to their risk aversions. More
importantly, there is no loss of total welfare caused by the game, and only the allocation of welfare
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gains is affected by agents’ strategic behavior. It is furthermore shown that the gain allocation
does not depend on agents’ (potentially asymmetric) bargaining power, whose influence vanishes
through the game procedure.
The exact premium (and hence the allocation of gains) is determined by the choice of the
common risk aversion of the equilibrium, where higher value means higher gain for the reinsurer.
This needs an extra criterion, and one already used in the related literature, is based on the notion
of Stackelberg equilibrium. According to the this, one of the agents is the leader who steps first on
the best-response procedure and the other follows. It turns out that in our game, the leader is the
one that gets all the welfare gain, leaving the follower indifferent between the status quo and the
equilibrium reinsurance.
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